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PROGRAMME EVALUATION FOR POLICY
ANALYSIS: OVERVIEW
 PEPA is about ways to do, and ways to learn the most 
from, “programme evaluation”
“estimating the 
casual impact of”“government 
policies” 
(although can 
often generalise)
PEPA: OVERVIEW
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Mike Brewer, 
Marcos Hernandez, 
John Ham
3. Control 
functions and 
evidence synthesis
Richard Blundell, 
Adam Rosen, 
Monica Costa Dias, 
Andrew Chesher
4. Structural 
dynamic models
Hamish Low, 
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Costas Meghir
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OVERVIEW
 Networks in economics
 Networks and programme evaluation
 Three case studies:
 Mexico
 Malawi
 Bangladesh
 Acknowledgements: slides based on work by 
Daron Acemoglu, Asu Ozdaglar and Sanjeev 
Goyal
NETWORKS
 Networks represent the interaction structure 
between units (nodes)
 In economic networks, these nodes can be 
individuals, firms, governments for example
 Study of networks useful for understanding many 
types of interaction:
 Information transmission
 Friendship/trust
 Diffusion of ideas
 Trade and exchange
 Response to programme interventions
 Spillovers to non-beneficiaries, distributional impacts
EXAMPLE 1
Information transmission: Networks structure of political blogs prior to the
2004 US Presidential Election: two separated clusters
[Adamic and Glance 2005]
• Programme evaluation: those in information networks of the direct beneficiaries
might also be affected
EXAMPLE 2
Social network of friendships in a 34-person karate club: club eventually 
split [Zachary 1977]
Programme evaluation: is there an optimal node to intervene on,
to maximize social impact?
EXAMPLE 3
The spread of an epidemic disease (TB shown) [Andre et al. 2007]:
• key distinction between economic and biological models is that in economic
models agents in part driven by strategic/choice considerations
• leads to the use of game theory to analyze behavior within networks
•Programme evaluation: if this pattern can be foreseen can policy react?
EXAMPLE 4A
Technology adoption: percentage of total corn acreage planted with 
hybrid seed [USDA]
Motivated Griliches [1957, 1958] seminal studies
EXAMPLE 4B
Technology adoption: use of modern contraceptive methods in rural
Bangladesh [Munshi and Myaux [2006]
• some communities reach tipping points and switch behavioural 
norms
•Programme evaluation: why the same policy might not be equally
effective everywhere
EXAMPLE 5
Co-authorship network of Jean Tirole in 1990s
•Programme evaluation: links not formed at random – can be endogenous, 
might also respond to interventions [last example]
SMALL WORLD EXPERIMENT
 Sociologist Stanley Milgrom originally studied 
the “Small World Problem” in 1967
 Asked certain residents of Wichita and Omaha to 
contact and send a folder to a target person by 
sending it to an acquaintance, who would do the 
same etc. until the target was reached
 Research question: how many links 
(intermediate nodes) would be required to reach 
the target?
 Result: 42 out of 160 letters made it to the 
target, with a median number of intermediate 
nodes equal to 5.5
INTERPRETING SMALL WORLDS
 Suppose each node has λ neighbours
 Each neighbour will have λ neighbours
 Suppose unrealistically that my neighbours 
don’t have neighbours in common
Hence in two steps you can reach λxλ neighbours
 In d-steps can reach λd other nodes
 Suppose network has n= λd nodes, so average 
distance is,
λln
ln nd =
GLOBAL DEGREES OF SEPARATION
 Commonly held belief of “six degrees of separation” between any 
two individuals on the planet,
λλ ln
7000000000ln
ln
ln
==
nd
 So if d=6, implies λ is around 19
 Experiment recently repeated by Duncan Watts, sociologist at 
Columbia, using email technologies
INTERPRETING SMALL WORLDS
 But this method rules out triadic relations and 
clustering phenomena, that we have seen are 
common in some of the visual examples
NETWORKS IN ECONOMICS AND
SOCIOLOGY
 Focus in sociology on group interactions so 
network structure is important
 notions of social capital, power and leadership
 Economics about allocation of scarce resources
 trade, cooperation, competition, information 
exchange, technology adoption etc.
 Neoclassical economics studies one of two 
extremes:
 markets: all interactions feasible and anonymous, 
e.g. GE theory
 games among few players: predetermined player 
identities, e.g. auctions 
NETWORKS IN ECONOMICS
 Social structures viewed of as being important in 
developing country contexts
 replace missing or imperfect markets
 in ‘modern’ economies, view was that trade takes place 
among anonymous agents meeting in markets
 examples in PEPA are from LDCs, but could expand in the 
future
 With greater recognition of information 
asymmetries, role of social networks to explain 
behavior in modern economics
 informal institutions also matter in developed economies
 Social networks will interplay with programme 
interventions in rich and poor economics
NETWORKS AS GRAPHS 1
 Can mathematically represent networks with 
graphs, that formalize the pattern of links 
between nodes
 Graphs can be directed or undirected
 Links can be weighted or unweighted, depending 
on whether links differ in importance
 A directed (unweighted graph) is,
G=(N,E)
 N = set of nodes 
 E = set of edges
NETWORKS AS GRAPHS 2
 jεN if j is a node in this network
 (i,j) εE if there is a link from i to j
 In a directed graph, this does not imply (j,i) εE
 Can also use notion gij=1 if (i,j) εE  and gij=0 
otherwise
 In a weighted graph, gij>0 would measure the 
strength of the link from i to j
 Can then use these building blocks to capture 
characteristics of nodes in a network
 In turn, these characteristics might determine 
how nodes are affected by policy interventions
POWER IN A NETWORK
 A measure of power that takes into account the 
location of nodes within the network is the 
“betweenness” measure
 P(i,j) = number of shortest paths connecting i to j
 Pk(i,j) = number of shortest paths between i and j that 
include k,
 Convention is that Pk(i,j)/P(i,j)=0 if P(i,j)=0
 Betweenness measure gives, for each pair of nodes, 
the fraction of shortest paths that go through node k
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EXAMPLE OF POWER IN A NETWORK
 Power of families in 15th
century Florence [Padgett 
and Ansell 1993]
 How did Medici’s become so 
influential in politics and 
economics?
 Betweenness  measure for 
Medicis is .522
 Next highest family is .255
 Will later see village figures 
for extended family networks 
in rural Mexico
OTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF
NETWORK STRUCTURE
 Degree distribution: average degree is very small 
relative to the number of nodes, and huge inequality
 Clustering: typically high in social networks; if links 
formed at random then in large n-node network with 
average degree k, clustering would be roughly k/n
 in economics co-authorship network (example 6), clustering 
coefficient is .157 (7000 times larger than would be 
expected with random matching)
 Centrality: Bonacich centrality is key measure 
explaining behavior in some models; also used to 
identify key players to remove from networks for 
maximal policy effect [Ballester et al. 2006]
RESEARCH QUESTION 1A: LINK
FORMATION
 What is the process by which links form and are broken?
 Key features of process of link formation:
 Linking is a decision
 Externality/spillovers: link between i and j affects the 
payoff of k and the payoffs to k from linking to i or j
 Combine: games of network formation
 Key modelling issues:
 Payoffs: linking generates rewards and entails costs
 Power: who decides on the link (uni or bi-directional)
 Information: what do I know about other players and 
the network when I form a link?
RESEARCH QUESTION 1B: LINK
FORMATION
 Are more links always better?
 Costs:
 trade-off with trust, investments per link, ability to 
punish non-cooperators in a network
 Benefits:
 provides access to new information, additional 
resources
 ability to change social norms, shift from low to high 
equilibrium payoffs
 Policy 1: whether and how process of link 
formation responds to policy interventions?
 Policy 2: are all socially optimal links formed?
RESEARCH QUESTION 2: DIVERSITY
 ‘Wisdom of Crowds’: combining information of many 
leads to better decisions
 especially so if crowd has diverse experiences and 
perspectives [Galton, de Condorcet]
 suggests large networks can reach more accurate decisions
 Concern is that ‘groupthink’ is also more prevalent in 
large groups (a form of herding)
 Cooperation (free-riding) and coordination harder to 
achieve in larger groups
 Arrows Impossibility Theorem: impossible for a group 
to have  decision rule that is efficient and non-
dictatorial and that satisfies the IIA
 Policy: do interventions have heterogeneous impacts 
across networks?
RESEARCH QUESTION 3: COMMUNICATION
 Have advances in information and 
communication technology changed the nature of 
social networks?
 Columbia small worlds experiment
 political blogs example: no guarantee that more 
diverse information is acquired
 can greater access to information increase ‘herding’?, 
i.e. excessive copying of others’ behavior
 Policy: how do policy impacts vary with 
communication technologies?
RESEARCH QUESTION 4: EMPIRICS
 PEPA focus is on how the impact of policy 
interventions interacts with the social networks 
of communities subject to the intervention
 Important implications for:
 evaluating policy impacts
 equilibrium effects of policies where the policies 
might impact non-eligibles through network 
structures
 understanding the distributional consequences of 
policy
 understanding why the same policy might have 
different impacts across locations
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES
 Progresa and extended family networks in 
Mexico
 The Women’s Group Programme in Malawi and 
networks of brothers and sisters
 The Ultra-Poor Programme in Bangladesh and 
village networks
De Giorgi et al (2010) Family Networks and School 
Enrolment: Evidence From a Randomized Social 
Experiment
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
THE PROGRESA PROGRAM
THE EVALUATION DATA
SURNAMES IN MEXICO
34
Heads have more family
ties present than their wives
Because women more mobile at
the time of marriage
(Rosenzweig and Stark 1989)
Similar family structures within the household (under the same roof)
EMPIRICAL METHOD
EMPIRICAL METHOD
Intra-generational links are more common than 
Inter-generational links
Similar family structures outside the household and within the village, across eligible and non-eligibles
FAMILY NETWORK DESCRIPTIVES
Family networks do not span 
more than three generations
Lots of variation within the same village
OUTCOME: CHANGE IN SECONDARY
SCHOOL ENROLMENT
Pr
e
v
i
o
u
s
l
y
 
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
l
a
s
t
 
l
e
c
t
u
r
e
 
(
S
h
u
l
t
z
 
2
0
0
4
)
42
No response among eligible but isolated households, neither for boys nor girls
Similar enrolment 
rates at baseline
43
Similar enrolment 
rates at baseline
Such high enrolment rates at baseline imply that 
conditional cash transfers for primary enrolment act as 
de facto unconditional pure income transfers
POLICY IMPLICATION
44
EXTENDED FAMILY NETWORKS ACROSS
VILLAGES
 Previous study focuses on heterogeneous policy 
responses depending on presence and 
characteristics of extended family network
 Took network structures as given
 Useful to explore correlations at village level 
between network structures and village level 
characteristics





SURVEY DESIGN
51
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES
 Progresa and extended family networks in 
Mexico
 The Women’s Group Programme in Malawi and 
networks of brothers and sisters
 The Ultra-Poor Programme in Bangladesh and 
village networks
MOTIVATION
 Households in rural areas of developing countries 
face a wide variety of risks and adverse events:
 agriculture, employment, health…
 Limited scope to cope with adverse events through 
formal channels:
 Few government programmes exist; concerns over how 
they are targeted
 Insurance and credit not widely available
 Households might engage in informal strategies to 
cope with adverse events
 Transfers, loans, gifts, labour sharing, etc (Besley, 1995)
 Social ties important for such informal strategies
MOTIVATION
 Interventions and policies may interact with the 
informal risk sharing provided by one’s social ties
 They may crowd out such risk sharing
 Interventions targeted at specific portions of a community, 
such as women or the poorest households, can make these 
groups more attractive to transact with and so improve 
risk sharing
 Theoretical literature in economics suggests that 
there may also be an optimal network size within 
which risk can be shared (Genicot and Ray 2003):
 Beyond a certain size, smaller groups within the larger 
social network may decide to walk away from the 
arrangement and share risk only with each other
 In large groups, easy to free ride – expect other social ties 
to provide help
RESEARCH QUESTION
 Objective: Understand how a Women’s Group 
Intervention in rural Malawian communities 
changed risk sharing arrangements in extended 
family networks
 Intervention changed social interactions in the 
treated communities, which may improve risk 
sharing
 Likely to have interacted with existing risk sharing 
networks
INTERVENTION
 Women’s group intervention implemented by Mai 
Mwana in Mchinji District, in the Central region of 
Malawi
 Set up by the Institute of Child Health at UCL. 
Similar interventions implemented in Malawi, Nepal, 
India, and Bangladesh
 A facilitator organises fortnightly meetings in the 
village to improve reproductive health (i.e. during 
pregnancy, delivery, and post partum)
 The groups are encouraged to follow a participatory 
approach: identify problems, devise strategies to 
overcome them, and try to involve the wider 
community in their implementation
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
 Participation in groups is voluntary (30% average 
participation rate)
 Intervention started in 2005 
 Intervention set up as part of a cluster randomised 
control trial:
 12 intervention clusters; 12 control
 Each cluster contains ~14 villages
 Each village contains ~ 42 households with a woman of 
reproductive age
DATA
 Survey of randomly selected women of reproductive 
age (independently of group participation)
 Two waves collected: Oct 2008-Feb 2009; Oct 2009-
Feb 2010
 Both waves are collected after the intervention started
 PDA based: increased accuracy, acceptance and 
interviewer motivation 
DATA
 Household consumption, including non-purchased
 Equivalence of non-standard units obtained through 
visits to markets
 Adverse events:
 Crop loss, business, theft
 2 measures of intensity:
 Dummy variable: Whether or not household experienced 
crop loss
 Relative importance of loss to household: estimated loss 
as a fraction of estimated (pre-intervention) monthly 
consumption
FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS 
 Main ethnic group in the area, Chewa are matrilineal
 Man moves to woman’s village after marriage
 Both can move to the man’s village if the man pays the 
woman’s family a marriage payment (relatively common in 
Mchinji because the Chewa have integrated with a 
patrilineal ethnic group – the Ngoni)
 A woman’s maternal uncle holds the power in the 
family
 He has general responsibility for the welfare of the family, 
and settles internal disputes, and obtains land for the 
family to use among other things 
 A woman’s eldest brother would have this responsibility for 
her children
DESCRIPTION OF FAMILY NETWORKS
Any 
Family 
Link
Any 
Family 
Link of 
Head
Any Family 
Link of 
Spouse
Any Intragenerational 
Links Any Inter-generational Links
Head Spouse Head Spouse
Mother Mother Brothers Sisters Brothers Sisters
Alive
Treated Zones 0.997 0.988 0.964 0.815 0.822 0.858 0.847 0.89 0.869
[0.002] [0.003] [0.011] [0.033] [0.015 [0.026] [0.03] [0.018] [0.017]
Control Zones 0.995 0.984 0.979 0.785 0.875 0.857 0.837 0.885 0.887
[0.003] [0.007] [0.007] [0.022] [0.015] [0.022] [0.021] [0.015] [0.017]
Difference 0.002 0.004 -0.015 0.03 -0.054** 0 0.01 0.005 -0.018
[0.003] [0.007] [0.013] [0.039] [0.021] [0.033] [0.037] [0.023] [0.024]
Living in the Same Village
Treated Zones 0.825 0.723 0.704 0.434 0.511 0.426 0.38 0.328 0.368
[0.036] [0.041] [0.032] [0.032] [0.025] [0.064] [0.04] [0.024] [0.042]
Control Zones 0.809 0.684 0.708 0.44 0.563 0.408 0.378 0.288 0.346
[0.034] [0.026] [0.039] [0.03] [0.032] [0.048] [0.027] [0.024] [0.045]
Difference 0.016 0.039 -0.004 -0.006 -0.052 0.018 0.003 0.04 0.023
[0.049] [0.047] [0.05] [0.043] [0.04] [0.079] [0.048] [0.034] [0.061]
ESTIMATION EQUATION
 We focus on informal risk sharing after crop losses
 Estimate whether households affected by a crop loss shock 
protect their consumption better if they live in a women’s group 
village than in a control village
 D = 1 if in women’s group village, 0 if in control
 Consider also how the effects of the intervention on informal 
risk sharing vary depending on the size of one’s family network
 1(.) is an indicator function, which =1 if Nihvt = 1; 0 otherwise
 N1hvt = 1 if hhld has 0 relatives of a particular type
 N2hvt = 1 if hhld has 1 or 2 relatives of a particular type
 N3hvt = 1 if hhld has 3 or more relatives of a particular type
RESULTS – BASIC SPECIFICATION
∆Ln(Cons) ∆Ln(Food)
Crop=1 or 0 Crop=Loss/
Pred. Cons
Crop=1 or 
0
Crop=Loss/
Pred. Cons
∆crop -0.09*
(0.05)
[0.09]
-0.0592**
(0.022)
[0.042]
-0.098
(0.06)
[0.12]
-0.0485*
(0.028)
[0.042]
∆crop*D 0.13*
(0.06)
[0.08]
0.0411*
(0.023)
[0.06]
0.138*
(0.078)
[0.07]
0.0308
(0.029)
[0.06]
N 1245 1221 1243 1219
RESULTS – BY NETWORK SIZE
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Δltot_cons Δltot_cons Δltot_cons Δltot_cons
Sisters Alive Brothers Alive
Crop = 1 or 0 crop = Loss/Pred. Cons Crop = 1 or 0 crop = Loss/Pred. Cons
Δcrop -0.119 -0.0713 0.0832 -0.00641
[0.0825] [0.0473] [0.0644] [0.0254]
Δcrop*D 0.13 0.0569 -0.0365 -0.0175
[0.118] [0.0487] [0.0879] [0.0261]
N1hvt = 1 0.0265 0.0311 -0.089 -0.0376
[0.0637] [0.0768] [0.0969] [0.0827]
N1hvt = 1*Δcrop -0.0443 -0.0644 -0.0838 0.0847
[0.0960] [0.185] [0.154] [0.0624]
N1hvt = 1*D 0.0262 0.00617 0.00387 -0.0576
[0.0856] [0.0966] [0.164] [0.150]
N1hvt = 1*Δcrop*D 0.0542 0.176 0.219 -0.0307
[0.204] [0.232] [0.221] [0.0921]
N3hvt = 1 -0.0518 -0.0649 -0.127** -0.117*
[0.0489] [0.0411] [0.0577] [0.0662]
N3hvt = 1*Δcrop 0.0704 0.0221 -0.403*** -0.242***
[0.0990] [0.0539] [0.102] [0.0478]
N3hvt = 1*D 0.103 0.124** 0.0598 0.0641
[0.0600] [0.0536] [0.0808] [0.0861]
N3hvt = 1*Δcrop*D -0.00346 -0.0552 0.388*** 0.284***
[0.152] [0.0647] [0.114] [0.0564]
Observations 1,238 1,214 1,235 1,211
R-squared 0.415 0.419 0.429 0.433
RESULTS
 Importance of mother’s brothers
 In line with family arrangements in this zone of 
Malawi
 In control areas, risk sharing is worse for those 
mothers with 3 or more brothers than those that 
have 1 or 2
 In line with Genicot and Rey (2003) prediction that a 
larger network might be detrimental (free-rider 
problem)
 In treatment areas, this is not the case. The 
program must help by either:
 Reducing the free-rider problem by making more 
costly to free-ride (knowledge someone is not being helped, 
shame...)
 Or facilitating new risk sharing arrangements 
substituting which substitute for the malfunctioning 
network
EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES
 Progresa and extended family networks in 
Mexico
 The Women’s Group Programme in Malawi and 
networks of brothers and sisters
 The Ultra-Poor Programme in Bangladesh and 
village networks
BANGLADESH ULTRA-POOR PROGRAM

Multiple Networks Types
From One Village
Red = family link
Blue = economic link
Purple = both types of link


CONCLUSIONS
 Empirical examples illustrate how:
 How networks aid risk sharing or resource sharing
 How multiple network types overlap
 Networks might themselves respond to interventions
